On the afternoon of September 3, a woman left the Palo Alto office of one of America's best known defence technology companies and began the drive north toward San Francisco. A silver Lexus SUV pulled in behind her. She made irregular turns. She took back roads. She cut into a grocery store parking lot. The Lexus stayed with her, according to federal prosecutors, through U-turns and illegal left turns and finally a red light, for nearly 30 miles. Frightened, she called 911 and was told to drive to the San Francisco Police Department's Mission Station. When she reached a police officer, the Lexus peeled away.
When officers later tracked down the driver, he had a simple explanation. "He said he saw a woman get into a car and thought she was beautiful," court papers say. He told them he had followed her because he wanted to ask her out on a date.
The Justice Department now says the truth was very different. On Wednesday, November 18, it announced that a federal grand jury had indicted Igor D'iu, a Russian national, on charges of conspiring to act as an agent of a foreign government, acting as an agent of a foreign government without notifying the Attorney General, interstate stalking and fraud involving identification documents. Prosecutors allege he was recruited, paid and directed by handlers working for Russia to watch, photograph and follow the employees of a Silicon Valley defence company, because that company was helping Ukraine fight Russia.
The indictment does not name the company. Three people familiar with the investigation told a US television network it was Palantir, the data and software firm that works for the Pentagon and has been one of Kyiv's most visible American partners since 2022. A financial news service first reported the link. The charges are allegations; D'iu has not been convicted of anything, and he is next due in federal court on November 24.
A recruit, a border crossing and a shopping list
The story laid out in the indictment and the FBI affidavit reads less like a classic spy novel than a gig economy job. According to prosecutors, D'iu was recruited by co-conspirators through an encrypted messaging app and took his instructions, equipment and money the same way. When he asked who he was working for, he was told "the Motherland." His handlers allegedly told him to gather information about the company because it was supplying weapons used against Russia in Ukraine.
In June 2026, the affidavit says, he flew from Istanbul to Mexico City, where his contacts connected him with a person who helped him cross the US border illegally. Once inside the country he was told to buy laptops, mobile phones, wireless networking gear and remote access software, which he did.
The first assignments were small. He was sent to a coffee shop near the company's Palo Alto office to pick out employees and photograph their laptop screens as they worked. Court filings made public on Wednesday include images said to show one employee sitting on a busy, shaded patio with a laptop open. He was also told to leave his own laptop at set spots near the office so his handlers could reach it remotely and try to pull data from company staff nearby.
Then, prosecutors say, the job grew. D'iu searched online for the home addresses of several employees, including a senior executive. He followed workers on the days before the September 3 chase. After Palo Alto police contacted him about that incident, he allegedly switched cars, changed his phone number and, on his handlers' orders, went to Reno, Nevada, before returning to the Bay Area to carry on.
Investigators also intercepted two international packages with identity documents hidden inside: a falsified California ID card, a Social Security card and a genuine US passport, issued to someone else, that had been altered to carry D'iu's photograph and the assumed name "Hugo Landry Johns." When FBI agents searched him and his home in East Palo Alto in October, they say they found about $18,000 in cash, two laptops, two iPhones, two Russian passports, networking equipment and a notebook with 10 handwritten addresses, many of them the homes of company employees. They also found detailed profiles of at least three employees, listing family members' names, education and work histories, and assessments of their strengths and weaknesses.
What the government is saying
Officials framed the case as an attack on the people who build America's weapons, not just on a company. "As alleged, D'iu entered our country illegally at the direction of foreign handlers to surveil, follow, and gather information about some of those who work in this vital industry," said M. Scott Proctor, the acting principal deputy assistant attorney general for national security. He called the alleged conduct "a flagrant violation of U.S. sovereignty and an unacceptable attempt at intimidation."
Craig H. Missakian, the US attorney for the Northern District of California, said his office would not tolerate efforts "to turn Silicon Valley into a base for foreign intelligence operations." Roman Rozhavsky, an assistant director in the FBI's counterintelligence division, said Russia "may rely on covert operatives and criminal intermediaries" in its war against Ukraine, "but those tactics do not place its government or its collaborators beyond the reach of the law."
A person familiar with the investigation said it was a company employee who first noticed D'iu's unusual behaviour and reported it, and that the firm then took its suspicions to the FBI. The person said the company's systems were not compromised. "The system worked," the person said.
Why this case is different
Russian spying in America is not new. What stands out here is the method, and the target. According to the people familiar with the case, it is the first known time since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Russia is alleged to have sent an operative into the United States to spy on an American technology company.
European security services will recognise the pattern at once. After governments across Europe expelled hundreds of Russian intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover in 2022, Russian services turned to remote recruitment of what Western officials call "disposable agents": people with money problems, migrants or petty criminals hired online for single tasks. Lithuania's State Security Department has described recruits who are told to take a photograph, mail a parcel or move an item from one place to another, often with no idea of the wider plan. "Their main motivation is the desire to make money quickly," one of its reports says. The less a recruit knows, the less he can reveal, and anyone who is caught can be replaced.
A brief published on November 17 by the Soufan Center, a New York security research group, says the tactic has escalated every year since 2022 and that payments often move through cryptocurrency brokers and informal cash desks, which banks are not yet trained to flag. In Europe the tasks have ranged from surveillance to a fire next to an arms factory and incendiary devices hidden in parcels.
Seen against that record, the D'iu case looks like the same playbook crossing the Atlantic. The tools were cheap: a few laptops, phones, an SUV, forged papers and a cash budget. The recruit was expendable. The goal was not only to steal data but, in the government's words, to intimidate the engineers and analysts whose work feeds Ukraine's battlefield.
Why Palantir
If the people familiar with the case are right about the company, the motive is not hard to see. Palantir was among the first major American technology firms to offer help to Ukraine after the 2022 invasion, and it has stayed. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy hosted its chief executive, Alex Karp, in Kyiv in May, saying afterwards: "Step by step, we are developing cooperation with the American defense sector." Louis Mosley, the company's executive vice president for Britain and Europe, wrote in a September post online: "We refused to work in Russia and China, even though that cost us money. We went into Kyiv in May 2022 and stayed."
Both armies are racing to gain an edge through software, drones and artificial intelligence. Experts say part of Ukraine's advantage is its access to Western technology that Russia has been shut out of. That makes the people who write and run that software a target in their own right. A source told the television network that America's adversaries understand "that's where the modern arsenal is forged."
The bigger picture in Washington
The case lands in the middle of a broader counterintelligence push. FBI Director Kash Patel said last week that the bureau had made 167 counterintelligence and espionage arrests since President Donald Trump began his second term, which he called a 53 percent increase over the same 21 months of the previous administration. "This FBI has no tolerance for anyone who breaks their oath to the United States," he said in a post online. Last month a former engineer at a leading artificial intelligence company was accused of planting a listening device at the firm; he has said he is not guilty.
The timing is awkward for the White House. The indictment was announced hours before Mr Trump's meetings with President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the summit in China, where the war in Ukraine is high on the agenda. A prosecution that accuses Moscow of running an intimidation operation against Ukraine's American suppliers on US soil is not the backdrop either side would have chosen for peace talks.
There is also a border dimension the administration is unlikely to ignore. Prosecutors say D'iu entered the country illegally from Mexico after flying in from Turkey. Officials who have argued for tougher border enforcement on security grounds now have a concrete case to point to; critics will note that he was caught by an alert employee, local police and the FBI doing their jobs inside the country.
What to watch
Three questions will shape what comes next. The first is whether prosecutors name anyone further up the chain. The indictment refers to co-conspirators but, so far, no handler has been publicly identified, and the people who run such networks rarely set foot in the countries they target.
The second is whether D'iu was alone. In Europe, investigators who caught one disposable agent have often found others working the same target, each knowing little about the rest. The affidavit's detail about laptops placed near the office to be accessed remotely suggests the handlers were trying more than one way in.
The third is how far the defence industry has to go to protect its people, not just its networks. Software firms can lock down servers. It is much harder to secure a coffee shop patio, a commute or a home address that can be found online. If convicted, D'iu faces up to 10 years in prison on the most serious count, plus up to five years each on the conspiracy and stalking counts. The more lasting effect may be on how Silicon Valley's defence workers think about the ordinary routines of their day.
