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A Trump Appointee Floated Carving Up Guyana. Say No

2026-11-21 · Washington Eye Team

Kaieteur Falls on the Potaro River in the rainforest of Guyana's interior, inside the Essequibo region claimed by Venezuela (photo: Amanda, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons), edited for Washington Eye cover
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In September, in a meeting room in Washington, a senior American official looked across the table at the foreign secretary of one of the most loyal partners the United States has in South America and, according to people familiar with the conversation, floated an idea that should never have left anyone's notebook: that Guyana might let Venezuela take partial control of the Essequibo, the vast region that makes up roughly the western two thirds of the country.

The official was Jeremy Lewin, who served as the State Department's director of policy planning from August until he left at the end of October. The diplomat across the table was Robert Persaud, Guyana's foreign secretary. Sources differ on the exact words used, and Lewin himself describes the talks only as "preliminary". But the reaction tells its own story. Guyanese officials were alarmed enough that they went straight to other State Department officials to ask whether American policy had changed. They were told it had not.

Since the episode became public this week, Washington has repeated that reassurance. We take it at face value. But a reassurance is not the same as a principle, and this administration owes Guyana, and every small country that has trusted American guarantees, something firmer: a plain public statement that the borders of a friendly democracy are not a bargaining chip in Washington's new romance with Caracas.

What actually happened

The outline, pieced together from people familiar with the matter and from Lewin's own account, runs like this. In May, Delcy Rodríguez, who became Venezuela's acting president after American forces seized Nicolás Maduro in January and flew him to New York to face narcoterrorism charges, wrote to President Donald Trump. In a letter dated 11 May, she asked for American help in creating conditions for a rapprochement with Guyana over what she called the "historic territorial controversy" in the Essequibo. The letter was provided to reporters by Lewin; its authenticity could not be independently confirmed.

In July, Lewin met Rodríguez in Caracas. Two people familiar with that meeting say they discussed the possibility of American companies doing business in the Essequibo. Then came the September meeting in Washington, where Lewin reportedly told the Guyanese that he had a very close relationship with Rodríguez and could help arrange bilateral talks. Two people said he floated Venezuelan partial control of the region.

Lewin insists he was not freelancing. "The White House asked me to conduct preliminary and confidential conversations with the Guyanese and Venezuelans to better dimension the issue for the Administration," he said, adding that he reported back to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the White House. Any suggestion that he acted on his own, he said, was "entirely false". The White House referred questions to the State Department. The State Department said it is "pitched different ideas and policy options from outside parties everyday" and that its position on the boundary has not changed.

Those two accounts do not sit comfortably together. Either a senior official carried a White House errand that the department now treats as an outside pitch, or he overstated his mandate in a room with a foreign government. Neither possibility is reassuring.

Why the Essequibo is not a real estate question

Venezuela has claimed the Essequibo on and off for more than 180 years. The modern boundary was set by an international arbitration tribunal in 1899, when Guyana was still the colony of British Guiana. By the Guyanese government's account, Venezuela accepted that award without protest for 63 years before challenging it in 1962, just as Guyana was nearing independence. A 1966 agreement in Geneva set out a path to settle the dispute peacefully. Half a century of talks and United Nations good offices went nowhere, and in 2018 the matter was sent to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

That court has twice upheld its own jurisdiction, in 2020 and again in 2023, over Venezuelan objections. In 2025 it ordered Venezuela not to proceed with elections in the disputed region. Hearings on the merits ran from 4 to 11 May this year, and Rodríguez herself led Venezuela's delegation. A final, binding judgment is expected within months; Guyana's government has pointed to a window between November and January, and President Irfaan Ali has said he hopes for a ruling early in the new year.

In other words, there is a process, it is nearly finished, and Venezuela has taken part in it. That is what makes the timing of a side channel so corrosive. On Friday Rodríguez restated that Venezuela rejects what she called the "fraudulent 1899 arbitral award" and does not recognise the court "or any related decision emanating from that body". Caracas is plainly preparing to ignore a ruling it expects to lose. Washington should be the loudest voice saying that is unacceptable, not the capital where alternatives are being quietly explored.

Follow the barrels

It would be naive to discuss the Essequibo without discussing oil. Huge discoveries in the waters off Guyana since 2015 have made it the world's fastest growing economy. On 16 November the fifth offshore project in the Stabroek block began production, lifting the country's installed capacity to about 1.1 million barrels a day. An American company operates that block with a 45 per cent stake, a second American company holds 30 per cent, and a Chinese state oil company holds the rest.

So the United States already has enormous commercial interests in a stable, sovereign Guyana. What it does not yet have is a comparable foothold in a Venezuela that has swung open its doors since Maduro's fall. On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth flew to Caracas and signed an agreement to restore military cooperation, with Rodríguez present. If the reporting about July is accurate, the idea of American firms working in the Essequibo was on the table well before that.

We do not claim to know what was in anyone's head. But the shape of the temptation is obvious: give Caracas a symbolic or partial win on a claim it cares about deeply, lock in a friendly government, and open new ground for business. That is how great powers have carved up small countries for centuries, and it is precisely what the post war order was built to stop.

The caveat that frightened Georgetown

The American embassy in Georgetown moved quickly to calm nerves. "The policy on the land boundary between the two countries has not changed," it said, adding that Washington supports the 1899 award, "which should be respected unless or until a new boundary is set by a competent legal body or with the consent of both parties."

Read quickly, that is a firm statement. Read carefully, the final clause is a door left ajar, and Guyanese advocates noticed at once. A New York based Guyanese diaspora group said it "completely rejects the intimation" that a new boundary could be drawn and urged Guyana's government to say so too. "Guyanese are not prepared to give an inch more," it said. "Not even a blade of grass!"

Guyana's own government has been more measured, and understandably so; it cannot afford a public quarrel with its most important partner. Its foreign ministry said the September meeting focused on the pending court ruling and on reaffirming American support for that process, and that "Guyana has received the assurance of the United States Government that nothing has changed since." Ali was blunter: the ruling "is what all of us would have to accept and that is it. There is absolutely no change from that."

What Washington should say now

We are not arguing that the United States should refuse to talk to Venezuela. A thaw with Caracas after years of crisis could bring real benefits, from migration to the drug trade to the lives of ordinary Venezuelans. Nor are we arguing that every conversation a diplomat holds must be scripted in advance.

We are arguing that some things should be off the table, and a neighbour's territory is one of them. A country of about one million people, wedged between Venezuela and Suriname, has done everything the United States asks of small states. It took its dispute to court instead of to the battlefield. It stood with Washington when relations with Maduro were at their worst. It welcomed American investment on a vast scale. If that record buys only a reassurance that "nothing has changed" after a senior official floated handing part of its land to its larger neighbour, other small partners will draw their own conclusions.

There is a simple fix. Rubio, who built much of his career on standing up to the government in Caracas, should state publicly that the United States will support whatever the International Court of Justice decides, will not broker any territorial concession outside that process, and expects Venezuela to comply with the ruling. Congress, where members of both parties have repeatedly voiced support for Guyana, should put that position in writing.

Hegseth's new military agreement with Caracas makes this more urgent, not less. If Washington is going to train and equip the armed forces of a government that still claims two thirds of its neighbour, it should make crystal clear that none of that help can ever be turned toward the Essequibo.

The court in The Hague will soon have its say. Until then, America's message to Georgetown and Caracas should fit on a single line: the border is a matter of law, not a deal. Anything less invites the kind of trouble that a little country with a lot of oil can least afford.

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