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Brussels Smelled Weakness. Now It Wants Silicon Valley's Cash

2026-11-22 · Washington Eye Team

Euro banknotes and coins of several denominations spread across a table (photo: Avij, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons), edited for Washington Eye cover
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On Saturday morning in Brussels, the man charged with brokering Europe's next seven year budget put a new line on the revenue side of the ledger. António Costa, the President of the European Council, proposed an annual levy of 3% on the net turnover that large companies earn in Europe from online advertising, digital intermediation services and user generated data. It would apply to any firm with more than €750 million in global turnover and at least €50 million in turnover inside the European Union.

Read those thresholds slowly and a single picture comes into focus. Almost every company big enough to pay this tax is American. European officials do not pretend otherwise. Reporting from Brussels this week was blunt about the reasoning: the bloc had held back from a tax like this for years because it feared retaliation from Washington, and the Republicans' heavy defeat in this month's midterm elections was seen as having created an opening. One European outlet put the calculation in plain terms: a Trump administration weakened at the ballot box will be less inclined to hit back.

We think Brussels has misread the moment, and we think it is up to Washington, all of Washington, to tell it so before European leaders sit down on Thursday.

Start with what the proposal actually is. Mr Costa's plan cuts the next long term budget, which runs from 2028 to 2034, by €204 billion compared with the European Commission's original draft, to about €1.78 trillion. To keep national contributions from rising, he wants a basket of new revenue streams worth around €60 billion a year: a share of carbon trading income, the bloc's carbon border tariff, levies on tobacco and on uncollected electronic waste, and the digital levy. An EU official estimated the digital piece would raise about €5 billion a year. The European Parliament, which first proposed the idea, had imagined a broader version raising up to €25 billion.

The digital levy replaces an earlier idea, a lump sum charge on any large company's revenue, that most European governments rejected because it would have hurt their own firms and their competitiveness. That detail matters. When the tax fell on European companies, member states killed it. When the same budget gap was moved onto a tax whose bill lands overwhelmingly in California and Washington State, it became the centrepiece of the compromise.

Supporters of the levy frame it as fairness. "These measures would also help create a level playing field in the single market, where American digital giants often face lower taxes than European firms," said Danuše Nerudová, a Czech member of the European Parliament. There is a real argument buried in that sentence, and we will come back to it. But notice how it is phrased. The target is not low taxed companies in general. It is American ones.

The tax is also designed in a way that economists of every stripe tend to dislike. It is levied on turnover, not profit. A company pays the same 3% on its European advertising revenue whether it made a fortune that year or lost money. Taxes on revenue are easy to collect and hard to dodge, which is why governments like them, but they are a blunt instrument. Much of the cost tends to be passed down the chain, to the European small businesses that buy online ads and the merchants that sell through digital marketplaces. France, Italy and Spain already run national digital taxes of this kind. The new plan would stack a Union wide layer on top.

None of this is a new quarrel, and that is the most important point for American readers. Opposition to discriminatory digital taxes is one of the rare positions in Washington that both parties have held for years. In 2019, trade officials found that France's national digital tax discriminated against American companies and prepared retaliatory tariffs. In 2021 the same process was used against digital taxes in several more countries, with tariffs drawn up and then suspended while governments negotiated a global corporate tax deal that was supposed to make such national levies unnecessary.

When Canada moved ahead with its own 3% digital tax, the warning did not come only from Republicans. In October 2023 the Democratic chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Ron Wyden, joined its senior Republican, Mike Crapo, in urging the Biden administration's trade representative to tell Ottawa that the United States would use every available trade tool if the tax went ahead. The two senators argued that it would fall almost entirely on American companies and put American employers at a disadvantage.

The second Trump administration turned up the volume. On his first day back in office in January 2025, the President declared that the global tax deal had no force in the United States. A month later he directed his trade representative to consider renewing the old investigations into the digital taxes of France, Austria, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In late June 2025, Canada rescinded its tax on the eve of its first collection date to restart trade talks with Washington. That August the President threatened substantial new tariffs on any country that kept such a tax.

So when Brussels bets that a defeat at the polls has changed the American position, it is betting on a misunderstanding. The midterms changed who will chair committees in January. They did not change the fact that the companies on the receiving end of this tax employ Americans in every state, pay American taxes and fund a large share of American research and development. A Democratic Congress has no more reason than a Republican one to let a foreign budget be balanced on those firms.

That is why we believe the most useful response now is not a tariff threat from the White House, which Europeans have learned to discount, but a clear, joint message from the incoming leaders of Congress of both parties. It should say three things. First, a European levy that targets American firms by design will be treated exactly as the national taxes in France and Canada were treated, through the existing trade investigation process. Second, the United States would rather go back to a negotiated, multilateral answer on how digital profits are taxed than see a patchwork of revenue levies. Third, the dispute is about the tax, not about Europe's right to set its own budget or to raise money in other ways.

We do not say this because the European case is empty. It is not. Large technology companies have spent years booking European profits in low tax jurisdictions, and the global deal that was meant to fix that has stalled, partly because Washington walked away from it. Europe also has real bills to pay. Its leaders are arguing over how to keep supporting Ukraine, and the German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has said there will be no budget agreement without unanimous financial support for Kyiv. Americans who want Europe to carry more of its own defence and its own aid burden cannot also insist that Europe never raise new revenue.

But there is a difference between raising revenue and choosing a tax because its bill is mailed abroad. Europe's own leaders seem uneasy with the plan for reasons of their own. Germany and a group of fellow net contributors want the budget smaller still. Mr Merz called the new draft "a first step" but said "its overall size remains too high." Sweden's Europe minister, Jessica Rosencrantz, was cool on new taxes in general: "It's money taken from somewhere else. It won't solve the financial equation." The French presidency called the proposal "very disappointing" on farm spending. The chief budget negotiator for the largest group in the European Parliament said it could not form the basis for the Parliament's consent.

In other words, the digital levy is not the settled will of a united continent. It is a bargaining chip in a fight among 27 governments, every one of which must agree to the final package, followed by the Parliament. Mr Costa's own paper says work on the underlying legislation must resume to reach agreement by 2027. That leaves plenty of time for the tax to be reshaped, shrunk or dropped, and plenty of time for the signal from Washington to matter.

There is a version of this story that ends well for both sides of the Atlantic. Europe gets a budget that its frugal members and its poorer members can live with. The United States and Europe return to the table on how to tax the profits of digital businesses, rather than their sales. American companies pay what they owe on profits they earn in Europe, and nobody pretends that a revenue grab aimed at one country's firms is a principled reform.

There is also a version that ends badly. Brussels adopts the levy on the theory that Washington is distracted. The White House, eager to look strong after a bad election, answers with broad tariffs that raise prices for American and European consumers alike. And a quarrel worth about €5 billion a year to the European budget, which is small change in a €1.78 trillion plan, becomes another front in a trade war neither economy needs.

Mr Costa said on Saturday that he believed his proposal "can bring us closer to a final agreement." Perhaps it can, inside Europe. But a deal reached on the assumption that the United States is too weak to object is not a durable deal. The fastest way to correct that assumption is for Democrats and Republicans to say, together and this week, that on this question there is no American weakness to exploit.

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