Five years ago, a gang fight broke out inside the federal detention centre in Honolulu. Kekai Watanabe was beaten with a padlock swung inside a sock. He says he told the prison medic who examined him that his pain was a ten on a scale of one to ten. He was given over-the-counter painkillers, and, by his account, told to stop being a crybaby. He spent more than two months in solitary confinement without seeing a specialist or a hospital. Seven months after the attack, an X-ray finally showed what he had been describing all along: a fractured tailbone, with chips of bone lodged in the surrounding tissue. He says he is still in "tremendous pain."
On Monday morning in Washington, the Supreme Court hears his case, Nielsen v. Watanabe. On paper it is a narrow dispute about one prisoner, one medic and one injury. In practice it is a referendum on a question that has rarely mattered more: when a federal officer violates the Constitution, can the person harmed ever make that officer pay?
The answer the justices give will travel far beyond a prison clinic in Hawaii. It will reach the streets where immigration agents now operate in large numbers, the homes that federal teams search, and the protests that federal officers police. For anyone who believes that constitutional rights mean little without a remedy, this is the case to watch this term, and the Court should resist the invitation in front of it.
In 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Court held that a person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by federal agents could sue those agents for money damages. The logic was simple and, for a conservative-minded reader, old-fashioned: public officers who break the law are personally answerable for it. The Court wrote that a federal agent acting unlawfully "in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own." Justice John Marshall Harlan, concurring, put the stakes in one line that lawyers still quote: "For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."
The Court extended that principle only twice. In 1979 it let a former congressional staffer sue a member of Congress for sex discrimination. In 1980, in Carlson v. Green, it let the family of a federal prisoner who died of an untreated asthma attack sue the prison officials who failed him. Since then, the Court has refused again and again. In Egbert v. Boule in 2022, it noted that it had "declined 11 times" to recognise similar claims and said that "in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts." Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, added that if the Court were deciding Bivens fresh, it would not discover such a right at all. In 2020 the Court shut the door on the family of a Mexican teenager shot dead across the border by a Border Patrol agent.
Lower courts were told to reject these suits if there was any rational reason to pause. The result is a doctrine that survives mostly as a museum piece. Mr Watanabe's lawyers have made a modest, careful argument: they are not asking the Court to extend Bivens an inch. His claim, his brief says, involves "the same kind of violation of the same constitutional right by the same type of defendant in the same institutional setting" as Carlson. A federal appeals court agreed, finding his claim "identical to Carlson in all meaningful respects."
The medic, Francis Nielsen, wants more than a win. His lawyers argue that the differences between the two cases are "profound": the prisoner in Carlson died within hours, so money was the only remedy, while Mr Watanabe survived and could, in theory, have used the prison grievance system or sued for an order requiring treatment. Then they go further. Bivens, Davis and Carlson, they write, are "relics of the bygone days when federal courts thought it appropriate to create causes of action Congress had not authorized," and "Bivens should be overruled." Their reply brief says the Court should stop offering the "empty, yet costly, false hope" of these lawsuits and hand the question back to the legislature "once and for all."
The Trump administration's position is revealing. Solicitor General D. John Sauer agrees that Mr Watanabe's suit should be thrown out and tells the justices that "Carlson has become entirely obsolete" after Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act and the Bureau of Prisons created its internal grievance programme. Courts, he argues, "will always have a reason to pause" before applying Carlson to new facts, which "means that no more Carlson claims will be viable." But he asks the Court not to overrule Bivens in this case, suggesting that if it wants to do so, it should wait for a Fourth Amendment case that looks more like the original.
Read that carefully. The government that employs the officers in question is asking the Court to declare the prison remedy dead in all but name, while keeping the larger question open for a case involving search and seizure, the very territory where its immigration agents now work every day.
It is hard to imagine a worse moment to tell federal officers that they can never be personally liable for breaking the Constitution. Complaints against immigration agents are rising, and the past year has brought accusations of beatings, vehicles driven into people and aggressive operations in American cities. Federal courts in several states have spent the autumn restraining federal agents and prosecutors who pushed against the limits of their power during the midterm elections. Whatever one thinks of any individual case, the pattern is a federal law enforcement apparatus that is larger, busier and more politically charged than it has been in a generation.
Steve Vladeck, a Georgetown law professor who filed a friend-of-the-court brief for Mr Watanabe's side, framed the choice bluntly in a radio interview. "What's at stake here is whether, basically, we as a country are going to hold federal law enforcement officers accountable when they violate clearly established constitutional rights," he said. "A world with no Bivens is a world in which federal law enforcement officers would enjoy absolute immunity, where no matter how egregious their conduct is, no one can hold them liable."
There is a striking asymmetry here. Since the Reconstruction era, federal law has allowed people to sue state and local officers, the police officer in Ohio or the sheriff's deputy in Texas, who violate their constitutional rights. No similar statute covers federal officers. So a person roughed up by a city policeman can go to court; a person roughed up by a federal agent on the same street, during the same protest, may have nowhere to go. Bivens was the patch for that gap. Remove it and the gap becomes a canyon.
The argument against Bivens deserves a fair hearing, and it is not only made by the medic's lawyers. Mary Hampton Mason, who spent nearly 35 years at the Justice Department in an office that handled these claims, argues that the doctrine has been so hollowed out that it misleads the people who rely on it. "In fact in the last 20 years, I'm only aware of one Bivens case that has resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs that didn't get reversed on appeal," she said in an interview, "and that's in thousands and thousands and thousands of cases filed." She also makes a point worth taking seriously: rogue officers are rare, and failures tend to be "institutional," the product of agency culture and training rather than one bad actor.
These points have force. But they argue for fixing the remedy, not abolishing it. A doctrine that rarely produces judgments is not the same as one that does nothing. Supporters note that judgment counts miss settlements, and they miss deterrence: an officer who knows he could be personally liable has a reason to think twice. "That's why damages are so important," said Gregory Cui, a civil rights lawyer at a legal advocacy centre who filed a brief in the case, "because they're a way to try to fix things, to give a person the means to pay for medical care or rebuild their life." His brief reports that federal prisoners who use the internal grievance system succeed about one per cent of the time. That is the "alternative remedy" the medic and the government are pointing to.
And the argument that Mr Watanabe could simply have sought an order for treatment misses what he is asking for. An injunction can force a prison to provide care tomorrow. It cannot pay for seven months of untreated fractures yesterday. As his brief puts it, only money can compensate a prisoner for "his past pain and suffering."
The strongest answer to the claim that only Congress can act is that Congress has acted, in its own way. In 1988 the Westfall Act took away prisoners' ability to sue federal officers under state law for their injuries, but expressly preserved constitutional claims of the kind brought in Carlson. In 1996 the Prison Litigation Reform Act made prisoners exhaust internal appeals before bringing such claims, which assumes the claims exist. Mr Watanabe argues that overruling Carlson now would create "a novel situation, never contemplated by Congress, in which federal prisoners who are subjected to needless suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment have no recourse against the responsible officers." Lawmakers built their statutes around Carlson. Pulling it out would leave those statutes resting on nothing.
Both sides in this case agree on one thing: Congress has the power to give people a clear statutory right to sue federal officers who violate the Constitution, as it did for state officers generations ago. So far, lawmakers have not advanced such a law. The new Democratic majorities in the House and Senate will take over in January. Oversight hearings into federal law enforcement would be useful. A plain statute, modelled on the existing law for state officers and written with sensible limits, would be better, because it would not depend on how five justices feel about a 1971 decision. Whatever the Court decides, that bill should be near the top of the list.
Kekai Watanabe is not a sympathetic figure in the way that a wrongly arrested schoolteacher might be. He was a federal detainee caught up in a gang fight. That is exactly why his case matters. Constitutional rights are tested at the edges, by the people least able to protect themselves. A government that can lock a man away with a broken bone for seven months, tell him to stop complaining, and face no consequence has not been restrained by the Constitution at all. The justices should keep the courthouse door open, even if only a crack.
